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Abstract
Low-tech industries, usually defined as industries with a low R&D component,
constitute an essential part of the economy in several countries. Providing knowledge
on how these industries may sustain economic growth and welfare in the future,
therefore represent a key policy issue. In this article a network approach to technical
change is applied. The socio-economic trajectory followed by one of the fastest
growing low-tech sectors in the Norwegian economy is studied. This path has been
shaped by core capabilities in the Norwegian technology infrastructure, and by
fundamental changes in governmental policies. It is shown that the increasing
competitiveness of the aquaculture industry has gone hand in hand with an increased
ability to transform and assimilate very advanced technologies generated within
other sectors of the economy. The ability to assimilate such products has been
enhanced both by governmental policies and by a dramatic increase in the market
concentration ratio within the aquaculture industry.
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11. Introduction
Recent insights and studies into the process of economic growth, triggered by
pioneering work by Schumpeter1, Abramovitz2 and Solow3, have put science and
technology issues right at the heart of economic policy and industrial
competitiveness. Today, few would dispute that a strong relationship exists between
technological and economic performance. However, this otherwise healthy
consensus has too often led to the oversimplified view that an economy’s future
ability to generate growth and welfare is predicated on the performance of ‘high-
tech’ sectors4 such as electronics (ICT generally), biotechnology (and related
industries, such as pharmaceuticals etc.). As a result, an overemphasis of the high-
tech sectors at the mainstream and research policy levels are created, usually at the
expense of low-tech sectors. Both a recent 15-country survey5 and the budget of EU
Third Framework Programme (1990-1994), testify to this situation. In the first, it was
found that the majority of governmental R&D support, particularly support of
industrial R&D, is channelled into high-tech sectors. The Framework programme
reveals that while 40% of the total research budget went into information and
telecommunication technologies, agriculture and agro-industrial research including
fisheries, received only 5%.
One misconception that has emerged in earnest is that only those countries that
command considerable strength in the creation of high-tech products and services
will be able to compete in the future and thus continue to provide welfare to their
populations. Can this be? Today, only a very limited number of countries are in fact
able to compete to any meaningful degree in the generation and production of high-
technologies. Hopeful competitors meanwhile are generally held at bay by extremely
high barriers to entry, entailing high costs and huge markets. The question is: Are
small countries, often specialising in low- and medium-tech oriented export markets,
thus precluded from generating wealth and general welfare in future?
                                                
1
 The late Harvard professor Joseph Schumpeter has powerfully argued through a number of books
that the capitalist engine is the introduction of new technologies, or in Schumpeter’s words: ‘the
introduction of new methods of production’. Particularly important work by Schumpeter are: Theorie
der Wirtschaflichen Entvicklung, 1912, Leipzig, Germany; Business Cycles, 1939, New York, USA;
Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 1942, New York, USA;
2
 Investigating the US economy since 1870, Abramovitz found in 1956 that the impact of technical
change on the American economy had been substantial: Abramovitz M., 1956, Resource and output
trends in the US since 1870, American Economic Reveiw, Papers and Proceedings, pp. 5-23.
3
 By investigating the US economy from 1909-1949, Solow showed that only one-eight of the total
production increase in the US economy was traceable to the increased capital to man-hour while the
remaining seven-eights had to be ascribed to technical change: Solow R., 1957, Technical Change and
the Aggregate Production Function, Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol 39 No 3, pp. 312-320.
4
 The commonly used definition of ‘high-tech’, ‘low-tech’ and ‘medium-tech’ is the following:
Sectors that spend less than 1% of sales on R&D are classified as low-tech, those spending between 1
and 4,5 percent as medium-tech and sectors that spend more than 4,5% are classified as high-tech.
5
 Nelson R.R. (editor), 1993, National Innovation Systems, Oxford University Press, Oxford, New
York, USA,
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The answer must clearly be “No”. It is actually wrong to assume that there is a
simple correlation between export specialisation in high tech and general growth. As
Van Hulst and Olds’ trans-national analysis6 showed, no such simple relationship
exists. Macro-economic figures do not indicate that the economic performance of
small countries was weaker, and empirical tests do not point to any significant
relationship between the two indicators of high-tech export specialisation and key
indicators of macro economic activity. Another cross national survey revealed
similar findings7.
What people tend not to take into consideration is that most so-called ‘high-tech’
sectors are actually engaged in the production of generic technologies. In practice,
they produce capital goods and intermediate goods which flow into other industries.
The performance of the economy as a whole therefore depends, not on whether one
are specialised in ‘high-tech’ or ‘low-tech’, but rather on how well the industry is
able to create competitive advantages by successfully accessing, transforming and
adopting advanced technologies generated in high-tech sectors. By implication, the
most efficient path to competitiveness of a nation therefore seems to be introducing
advanced technologies into those sectors in which they already hold a comparative
advantage8. Doing this requires i) a knowledge-based, dynamic policy and ii) major
innovative efforts to be undertaken within all sectors of the economy.
This paper will analyse variables affecting innovation capabilities in an increasingly
important industrial branch in Norway, the aquaculture sector. The focus will be on
the impacts of governmental policies. We will follow the transition from what might
be labelled a ‘low-tech policy’ to a ‘high-tech policy’. The analyses is basically a
Schumpeterian, or an evolutionary one. This approach, based on induction rather
than deduction, suggests that technological choices are restricted and path
dependent9. Hence technological performance are bounded by historically given core
capabilities, former options, governmental policies and the ability to integrate
successfully into a wider technological infrastructure, or network, and thereby being
able to access and adopt distant technologies. From this point of view, technological
performance is therefore neither seen as exogenously given (as proposed by neo-
classicists) nor as given by R&D intensities10 only (as assumed within the linear
                                                
6
 Hulst .V. and Olds, B., 1993, On High Tech Snobbery, Research Policy 22, 455-62.
7
 Nelson R.R. (editor), 1993, National Innovation Systems, Oxford University Press, Oxford, New
York, USA.
8
 Hulst .V. and Olds, B., 1993, On High Tech Snobbery, Research Policy 22, 455-62.
Hulst V., Mulder R., and Soete L. G., 1991, Exports and technology in manufacturing industry,
Weltwirschaftliches archiv, June, 1991
Ergas H. , 1986, Does Technology Policy Matter, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels
9
 Nelson R.R. and Winter S. G., 1982, An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change, Harvard
University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA.
Smith K., 1991, Innovation Policy in an Evolutionary Context, in Evolutionary Theories of Economic
and Technological Change, edited by P.P. Saviotti and J. S. Metcalfe, Harwood Academic Publisher,
Chur, Switzerland.
Dosi G., 1982, Technological Paradigms and Trajectories, Research policy, nr 11, 147-162, North
Holland Publishing Company.
10
 Looking to this indicator of innovative performance only, policy makers may in fact have some
reasons for concern: Key sectors in the Norwegian economy including , fish and fish products, are
characterised by low R&D activity and moreover, these industries spend considerable less on R&D as
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model). On the basis of these insights we will trace the path through time and space
followed by the aquaculture industry.
                                                                                                                                         
a proportion of output than competing industries in other OECD countries. In this study we will,
however, show that there are other determinants being equally important for innovative performance.

52. The Rise of the Aquaculture industry,
Developments and Policies
2.1. The Historical Dimension
The first known Norwegian initiatives within aquaculture came about in 1855, when
customs officer Hetting was employed as inspector of fresh water fisheries. His task
was to travel around the country and investigate the conditions and opportunities for
artificial fertilising of trout in Norwegian lakes. Subsequently, a number of hatching
units for trout and salmon were built. Hetting, together with Dr Rasch, a dedicated
professor at the university, experimented further with trout and salmon farming in so-
called ‘salt water parks’. The idea was to exploit the rapid growth of trout and
salmon in salt water, by setting them into enclosures at sea. These experiments
resulted in the development of one large salt water park near Larvik in 1875 and
another at Sotra in 1877. The project was surrounded by optimism. To general
disappointment, the weakly constructed enclosures broke up at sea and the fish
disappeared into the open ocean.
During the following decades, several entrepreneurs tried out a number of different
concepts but failed. A successful approach to farming salmon in a natural habitat was
not found until 1967 when Thor Mowinkel managed to start raising salmon into an
enclosed bay. The following year, in co-operation with the large Norwegian firm,
Norsk Hydro, he released 70,000 smolt into the sea at Sotra. This success was
followed by a breakthrough in floating enclosure technologies in the early 1970’s.
The new technique was based on freely floating ponds in the sea, meaning that
production need no longer be tied strictly to geographical sites such as bay. The
benefits of the new techniques started to be reaped, and investment per produced fish
fell dramatically. New potentials within aquaculture now became apparent.
Based on the biological and technological breakthroughs on this front, the
Norwegian Ministry of Fisheries and the Ministry of Agriculture proposed exploring
the potential of artificial hatching, the rearing of fingerlings as well as the rearing of
market-sized fish. A proposal was forwarded in 1971, leading to the creation of the
so-called ‘Lysø-committee’ in 1972.
The ball had begun rolling. Through a combination of private entrepreneurship and
government incentives, fish production expanded dramatically. From the early
1980’s there has been an exponential rise in fish production. Today, Norway is the
largest producer of Atlantic Salmon by far, while, in the Norwegian economy ,
aquaculture has proven one of its fastest growing sectors. Annual production exceeds
200,000 tonnes. Fish and fish products represent the third largest export sector in
Norway, of which aquaculture is ever more essential. In 1980 the export of farmed
fish represented 6% of the total export value of fish and fish products. Today this
relative share has increased to more than 40%. As a result, approximately 6,000
persons are directly employed in the production of fish in Norway, providing a
particularly important source of income for remote regions. What happened, and
especially, how did political measures impinge on the sector?
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2.2. The Political Dimension
The regional dimension of the aquaculture sector has constantly been stressed by
Norwegian politicians. Until recently, essentially two types of objectives have been
emphasised by Norwegian regional policy:
• Equality
• Preservation
These two objectives, equal distribution of income and the preservation of traditional
settlement, was strongly prominent within aquaculture policies from the early 70’s.
The ‘Lysø committee’, mentioned above, saw the establishment of large aquaculture
installations as a direct obstacle to these objectives11. Accordingly, they proposed
setting a ceiling on yearly production per farm12 emphasising that small-scale
aquaculture could be made efficient when co-ordinated with agriculture and fishing.
The size of a farm was not allowed to increase beyond one man-year. These ideas
were developed further in the Report to the Parliament from 197913 at which point a
number of restrictions on ownership. Farmers were not allowed to own more than
one farm, owners were to be settled in the area of production and individual
ownership was to be promoted. It was made clear that profit-seeking speculators
were not wanted in this business.
Policies thus set about to establish a sector that might spread and take root in the vast
regions of Norway. The regional-political dimension implicit in these policies
favoured a labour intensive approach to the industry. This in turn had rather direct
implications for the development of relevant technology. It meant that new
technologies that could rationalise labour were kept out14:
‘The conditions offered by Norwegian nature to exploit aquaculture in shielded
areas, together with the possibilities of regulating costs within the aquaculture sector
are, according to the Ministry of Fisheries, sufficient to establish a competitive
aquaculture industry. In order to stay competitive, the Ministry of Fisheries sees no
need to rationalise or cut the places of work. Given a level of production, the
regional effects are greater, the more workers that are employed. Hence, when
designing future plants and plant structures, production should be based on a work
intensive concept’
                                                
11
 This is emphasised in Fiskeridepartementet, 1972-73, Om midlertidig lov om bygging, innredning,
etablering og utvidelse av anlegg for klekking av rogn og oppdrett av fisk, Ot.pr. 46, §2, p.3, Oslo,
Norway.Qouting from this paper “The committee sees the aquaculture sector as a crucial contributor
to the general development of remote regions of Norway. From this point of view, the committee sees
the development of large units that have the characteristics of industry, as undesirable” ( my
translation.)
12
 This proposal was never followed up by formal laws. Instead production were indirectly restricted
by putting an upper limit on the volume of the ponds. As a result several farmers increased the density
of fish and a number of deseases spread quickly within each farm and between farms.
13
 Stortingsmelding nr. 71, 1979-80, Oslo, Norway.
14
 Stortingsmelding nr. 71, 1979-80, Oslo, Norway.
NOU 1992:36, Krisa i lakseoppdretsnæringa, Oslo 1992
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In other words, politicians supported a non-innovative climate during this period.
The results of the policies are reflected in Fig.(1). In this figure, it becomes clear that
labour productivity in fact remained relatively stable for the period, implying a low
degree of technical change, innovation and learning.
However, policy makers started to move in a new direction during the mid-80’s. It
became clear that the implemented policies had not fully taken out the vast potentials
inherent in Norwegian aquaculture. Capital was difficult to attract to the sector.
Several farmers and investors put their money into foreign countries were laws and
restrictions (imposed on the aquaculture sector) were less rigid. Adding to the
problem, was the fact that throughout the 80’s farms where hunted by several severe
diseases. This showed that aquaculture indeed was a risky business. This was
especially so in Norway, where risks could not be spread on several farms due to
ownership regulations. As a result investments in aquaculture were reaching a
suboptimal state and so did also the potential creation of a number of places of work.
Simultaneously, the international prospective of aquaculture was clearly revealed due
to the decrease of the wild fish stock. Farmed fish represented an interesting
substitute.
As a result the policy makers implemented a ‘high-tech policy’ within a ‘low-tech’
industry. The policy implications of making the aquaculture industry internationally
competitive can be seen in ‘Odelstings proposisjon’ 53, 1984-85, which stressed the
need for regulations to become more flexible. The Report to the Parliament from
198615 followed up on this line by stressing the importance of developing a profitable
and competitive industry.
This vote of confidence, as it were, led to aquaculture being launched as a key
industry in several regions in Norway.  R&D figures from the period reflect the
extent of change. From 1984 to 1989 the public R&D expenditures rose by
approximately 300%. Meanwhile ownership regulations were gradually liberalised.
The requirement for localised ownership/management of farms was dismantled in
1984/8516. This attracted new capital to the sector, although major investment
opportunities were narrowed due to a law that restricted the number of farms that one
person could own. This restriction was softened in 1991 and hence opening up for
the possibility of market concentration. Single owners or firms were given
permission to own more than one farm, though a clause remained giving the
department authority to restrict owner concentration in special cases17.
Simultaneously, the maximum permitted farm sizes were allowed to increase, from
3000 cubic metres in 1981, 5000 cubic metres in 1983, 8000 cubic metres in 1985
and 12000 cubic metres in 1988.
In sum three major policy incentives gathered momentum from the mid 1980’s:
• A substantial rise in governmental R&D
• Liberalisation on ownership
• Increase of permitted farm sizes
                                                
15
 Stortingsmelding nr 65, 1986-87, Om havbruk, Oslo, Norway.
16
 Ot.prop.nr.53 (1984-85)
17
 Fiskeridepartementet, 1990-91, Om lov om endring i lov 14. juni 1985 nr 68 om oppdrett av fisk,
skalldyr m.v., ot.prop.55, Oslo, Norway.
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What were actually the impacts of these radical changes imposed on the industry?
These questions will be explored in the following sections.
93. Impacts of the Policy Transition
It may be argued that , during its development phase of 70s to the mid 80s, the
aquaculture industry had been suspended in a state of equilibrium by highly
restrictive policies that surpressed learning potentials, scale economies and the
subsequent adoption of advanced technologies. In this period , fairly equal players,
both in size and competence made up the market. Capital and competence were
difficult to attract and both capabilities and incentives to innovate were very poor.
Interviews conducted inside the industry during the period indicated that
technologies were seen as being simple and easy to imitate. Technical change moved
only very slowly and incrementally. The industry was in a stage of very nearly
perfect competition, moving within an equilibrium state where the needed time for an
innovation to emerge largely exceeded the time it would take that technology to be
diffused and imitated. In other words there were hardly any barriers to entry, no
economies of scale and information spread reasonably perfectly. The situation thus
resemble the theoretical conditions upon which neo-classical economics usually
build: Firms had relatively unproblematic access to all available technologies and
could switch between technological choices rapidly and with little costs18.
Figure 1: A comparison of labour productivity growth in aquaculture, forestry and
oil production from 1978 - 1991. Labour productivity is set at 100 for all three
industries in 197819.
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18
 PREST, MERIT, NR, 1993, Technology and the Transition to Environmental Stability, Maastricht,
The Netherlands
19
 Statistisk sentralbyrå, Oslo, Norway.
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After the emergence of the new policies, the situation changed dramatically. From
this point, the position of technology begins to defy the assumptions of the neo-
classical model, recommending it for an evolutionary framework. Technical change
started to gather momentum and imitation time lags where exceeding innovation
times. A first indication of the development is seen when looking to labour
productivity data. Hand in hand with the changed competitive environment in
aquaculture, labour productivity has increased dramatically. Between 1987-1991
labour productivity increased by a factor 3.3, Fig.(1). By way of comparison, the
fastest growing industrial sector in the period 1924-1950 had an increase in output
per operative of 272%20; placed against newer figures from industries like oil and
forestry, the productivity increases in aquaculture compare favourably as well (cf.
Fig.(1)). We follow up this discussion in the sections to come, getting a deeper
understanding of the development and its causes.
3.1. Market Structures and Technical Change
The new emerging policies in the mid 80’s, resulted in a substantial increase in the
production capacity per farm. Measured in tons the average production was more
than doubled from 1986 to 1990. In 1982 approximately 40% of the farms produced
between 0-50 tons of fish for consumption, while in 1990 only 0,7% of the farms
produced between 0-50 tons. What are the impacts of this production increase? In
this section we explore the concept of learning curves that dynamically relates output
quantities to innovative capabilities and technical change.
The learning curve effect is a pragmatic observation which has been systematically
seen in a number of industries throughout the world: Production costs of a particular
item tend to sink as a function of time and practice. This effect was first observed in
1925 in the Wright-Patterson Air Force base in Ohio21. The assembling of aircrafts
showed the following pattern: The fourth plane required only 80% as much direct
labour as the second, the eighth plane, only 80% as much as the fourth and so on.
Thus the rate of learning to assemble aircraft was concluded to be 80% between
doubled quantities. This implies that learning increases rapidly in the production of
the first units, and eventually falls off with volume. This is illustrated mathematically
by Eq.(1)
[ ] 21 CVChourmanperoutputLearning −=− (1)
or inverting Eq.(1)
[ ] 22
1
1 CC VCV
C
outputperhourmantyProductivi ==− (2)
V is accumulated volume. C1 and C2  are constants, where C1 is determined by initial
conditions and C2  is determined by the learning rate within the specific industry. C2
takes a value between 0 and 1 and hence productivity change has the characteristics,
dp/dv >0 and d/dv(dp/dv) < 0.
                                                
20
 Reinert E., 1980, International Trade and the Economic Mechanism of Underdevelopment, Ann
Arbor, University Microfilms International, Michigan, USA.
21
 Hirschman, W. B., 1964, Profit from the Learnig Curve, Harvard Business Reveiw, USA.
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As a result of different levels of complexity in different industries, learning does of
course vary. Theories about these mechanisms can be traced all the way back to
1776, when Adam Smith wrote ‘The Wealth of Nations’. Smith argued that with a
larger output of some product, variable cost coefficients would decrease due to the
division of labour. Smith gave three reasons for this decrease in cost22: i) workers can
specialise more and build up a greater proficiency in their work, ii) time is commonly
lost when passing from one type of work to another, iii) the invention of machines
that facilitate and reduce labour will raise output per worker23.
More generally, learning curves may be interpreted in two ways, either in a static or
a dynamic way. According to the static interpretation, increased productivity results
from instantaneous rises in productivity when scaling up. If output contracts and the
company scales down, these productivity gains are immediately lost. The gains in
productivity are thus reversible. The dynamic interpretation, on the other hand,
entails an irreversible process. Learning-by-using and learning-by-doing are
important factors in this category. These factors are usually ascribed to the rate of
growth in output where the gains result from ‘learning’ more efficient methods of
production and are as such not lost even when the company scales down. An
essential observation is that a rapid expansion of production eventually leads to (as
a well as being a result of ) a greater rate of innovation and a climate more
favourable to risk taking24.
This fact is closely related to variables influencing innovation like the cost of capital
and competence. Employing competent, well-educated people is usually quite costly.
These costs must generally be spread over a larger output. Spreading the salary of for
instance the manager over a larger output volume, opens the possibility of paying
higher salaries which presumably will attract managers of superior ability. The
relative cost of a supervisor or highly educated people will determine, in the long
run, the company’s incentive to hire well educated people. The increasing outputs of
aquaculture firms hence open for rising competence levels as the cost of attracting
and retaining this expensive human factor can gradually be spread over larger output.
This can lead to a virtuous circle of development, whereby higher general education
levels in the fishery industry are stimulated thus raising innovative performance and
competitiveness of the fishery industry in general25. Traditionally low competence in
this specific industry has in fact constituted a substantial problem. Studies from the
early 80’s reveal that while the share of white collar workers in Norwegian industry
in general was 27%, this share was only 10% within the fishery sector26. Less than
40% of the employees holding leading positions had completed secondary school,
less than 10% have formal education from business schools or technical schools
lasting more than one year.
                                                
22
 Scherer, F.M. and Ross, D, 1990, Industrial Market Structures and Economic Performance, third
edition, Houghton Mifflin Company, New York, USA.
23
 One negative effect of the division of labour is the problem that arises when workers are too
spezialized and consquently are unable to adapt creatively to new situations and technical change in
general. The trend has been away from such specialization where creative adaption is important.
24
 Mc Combie J.S.L., Verdoorn’s Law, Palgrave Dictionary
25
 Kommunaldepartementet, 1990-91, På rett kjøl, om kystens utviklingsmuligheter, Stortingsmelding
nr. 32,Oslo, Norway.
26
 Fiskerinæringens landsforening, 1994, Norsk fiskeindustri mot år 2000, Troms trykk AS, Tromsø,
Norway.
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In addition to raising its competence recruiting power, the aquaculture industry can
further expect to reap benefits from increasing production on capital markets. A
study of the cost of debt in the 60’s revealed that corporations with assets of $5
million borrowed at an average interest rate of 0.74 percentage points higher than
firms with assets of $200 million while billion dollar corporations enjoyed a 0.34
point incremental advantage over these27. Investors demand higher returns from the
securities of small corporations as compared to larger ones owing to expectations of
risk: Statistical studies indicate that profitability varies less over time for large
individual companies than for smaller companies28. Thus some of the traditionally
large problems in the fishing sector, related to low capital accumulation, may be
overcome by exploiting scale economies in capital borrowing. Generally among
several industrial sectors, lack of capital access, especially in the periphery, is seen as
a major obstacle to innovation29.   
The important fact to emphasise is that the general phenomenon of learning curves is
very relevant in studying the aquaculture industry, which exhibits special rates and
quality of learning. Fig.(2) demonstrates that the enormous production increase from
the mid 80’s is associated with a substantial labour productivity increase. When
imposing the ‘80% inverse learning curve’ on the inverse learning curve in
aquaculture, Fig.(2), it is seen that the Norwegian aquaculture industry had a
relatively slow start compared to the standard 80% pattern of learning. Throughout
the 80’s the fish farm learning curve approaches the 80% standard curve. In the early
90’s, however, it actually takes off from that curve.
The fluctuations of the aquaculture learning curve relative to the general 80%
learning curve may be seen not only against the background of the increased
production of farmed fish, but also on the background of the increased market
concentration ratios that emerged during the period. The four-firm market
concentration index CR4, rose from less than 5%30 in 1990 to nearly 25% in 1993. In
the early period of the industry, the market concentration ratio was even less than
5%. Thus the accumulated volume of output per farm, relative to the total output,
was very low during the 70’s. According to the premise of this section, low
accumulated volumes result in low experience per farm and therefore a poor
innovative climate, slowing progress down the cost-output curve. In the 90’s the
market concentration ratio increased rapidly, pushing up the accumulated volume per
farm increased, and with it the rate of innovation, while pressing on down the cost
output curve.
                                                
27
 Scherer, F.M. and Ross, D, 1990, Industrial Market Structures and Economic Performance, third
edition, Houghton Mifflin Company, New York, USA.
28
 Scherer, F.M. and Ross, D, 1990, Industrial Market Structures and Economic Performance, third
edition, Houghton Mifflin Company, New York, USA.
29
 Nam, Ch. W. et al., 1990, An empirical assessment of factors shaping regional competetivness in
problem regions, Commision of the European Commmunities, Luxembourg.
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Figure 2 : The inverse 80% learning curve, Eq.(5.3), and the spline interpolating the
labour productivity data within aquaculture31, 1978 - 1993. The first datapoint for
aquaculture corresponds to the year 1978, the second to the 1979 etc.32
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There are several implications of the existence of learning curves. I will review some
of those related to public policy below33: Learning curves or experience curves are
not only related to the increase in labour productivity. In general, learning curves are
related to the decrease of costs when the accumulated produced volume of a
company increases. One possible implication of this is that that antitrust policies lead
to higher costs for each company and to a lower degree of technical change in
general (due to narrowing learning opportunities). The Boston Group estimated that
if all production of one product is concentrated in one producer instead of spread
equally among 8 producers, the costs would be 35% to 50% that of the average costs
of these 8 producers. This is especially interesting when looking at aquaculture, a
highly export-oriented industry. Companies with the highest degree of experience, or
those with the highest production volumes, have from the above theories the lowest
costs34.
If the expansion of Norwegian firms is limited by governmental regulations, while
foreign firms are not, foreign firms may run down the cost-volume curve faster than
competing Norwegian firms, thus reducing costs faster than Norwegian firms. If
foreign firms decide to trade current profits for future markets and lower prices,
Norwegian firms may be trapped. In this situation, a gap between the cost-structures
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14 STEP rapport / report R-02/1995
of large unregulated foreign firms and those of Norwegian ones would quickly open,
squeezing the latter firms out of the international market. Following the argument in
this section, to overcome such a gap would mean letting Norwegian firms again
increase production volumes and exposing them to a painful and lengthy process of
selling below costs. However, this path seems neither desirable in terms of its
economic consequences nor permissible in terms international dumping regulations.
It should be noted that claims of dumping have been lodged against Norwegian firms
before by the EU countries and the US and that these threatened to put the
aquaculture cluster in Norway out of business35. Therefore, regulation of the industry,
especially with regard to the size of enterprise unit, should clearly be kept in mind
both due to the importance of the Norwegian aquaculture industry for regional
employment and its reliance on establishing and maintaining international
competitiveness.
What is then the ‘correct size’ of a fish farm? First we must explore technological
change within the sector, a variable which surely affects the ‘correct size’ of fish
farms.
3.2. The Role of Aquaculture within the Norwegian Knowledge
Infrastructure
In parallel with the changed market conditions and the rapid learning taking place
within the aquaculture industry, its ability to develop networks with science and
supplier enterprises has increased. We explore the absorptive capacity and the
technological opportunities of the industry in this section.
According to evolutionary theories, the ability to produce new economic growth in
an industry largely depends on its potential to regenerate its technological bases
and/or the extent to dynamic technological opportunities exist in an industry. In this
light, the question then becomes: what types of changes in technologies are
undertaken within the industry, where are the major areas of technological advance
and the main “knowledge bases” which support and co-operate with the industry36.In
exploring these issues for the aquaculture case, three central aspects are interesting:
• firstly , the specific activities which are involved in aquaculture
• secondly, the types of techniques which are used, and
• thirdly, an overview of the kinds of knowledge bases which underlie those
techniques
A general overview is provided in the following table:
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Table 1: Activities, technologies and scientific knowledge bases in Norwegian
aquaculture. Research institutes committed to the different activities are also
indicated.37
Activity Technology Research Knowledge Bases
Construction of
Ponds, moorings,
cranes, lifting-
equipment boats
materials technology, wave analysis,
hydrodynamics , surface technology,
construction- and welding technology,
Information technology, CAD, CAM,
Simrad Subsea AS, Sintef Norsk
hydroteknisk laboratorium,
Marintek,
Havforskningsinstituttet,
Fiskeriforskning
Monitoring Sonars, information technology,
computerimaging, electronincs, advanced
mathematical algorithms, acoustics, optics
Simrad, Lindem, Sintef
Health, laboratory
services, vaccines,
chemicals
nutrition technology, bio technology,
electromicroscopy, gas technology,
thermodynamics, marine biology, chemistry
hydrodynamics
Norges Veterinnærhøgskole,
Norconserv, Akvaforsk NLVF,
Fiskeridirektoratets
ernæringsinst., Inst. for
næringsmiddelhygiene-NVH ,
Inst. for bioteknologi Sintef
Norsk hydroteknisk lab.,
Havforsknings inst., Inst. for
fiskeri-og marinbiologi, NINA,
Fiskeriforskning, Vetrinærinst.,
Norbio AS, Inst. for fiskeri-og
marinbiologi, Inst. for akvakultur
NVH, Fellesavdeling for
farmakologi og toksokologi
NVH, Inst. for medisinsk biologi
UNIT, Inst. for mikrob. og
plantefysiologi UIB, Teknisk
kjemi Sintef, Biologisk inst. UIO
Feed process control, industrial processes,
chemistry, marine biology, hydrodynamics,
extrusion technology, monitoring
technologies, information technology,
nutrition technology
Akvaforsk NLVF,
Fiskeridirektoratets
ernæringsinst., Inst. for
bioteknologi Sintef, Sintef
Norsk hydroteknisk
laboratorium, Havforsknings-
instituttet, Sildeolje- og
sildemelindustriens
Forskningsinst.,
Fiskeriforskning,
Fiskeridirektoratets
ernæringsinst, Marintek AS,
Norges Fiskerihøgskole
Feeding Machines materials technology, information technology,
telecommunication, electronics, cybernetics
high pressured air technologies, robotics,
welding technology
Fiskeriforskning, Akvaforsk
NVL Ås
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Table 1 (Continued)
Measurements and
manipulation of
colour and fat
nutrition technologies, biotechnology, spectro
photometer, bio physics, computer
tomograghy,
NIT, NIR, NMR spechtrography, 3D
measurements, visions and camera
technology, marin biology
Norsconserv, Fiskeriforskning,
Akvaforsk, institutt for
bioteknologi Sintef
Measurements and
manupilation of
stress before
slaughtering
high pressured liquids, chromography,
magnetic resonance, biophysics, marin
biology
Teknisk kjemi Sintef,
Fiskeriforskning,
Havforskningsinstituttet
Slaughtering,
filleting
mechanical industry, mechanics, information
technology, acoustics, optics
Fiskeriforskning
Sorting, counting
and weighing of
fish
mechanical industry, information technology,
electronics, laser technology, mathematical
algorithms, optics
Fiskeriforskning,
Havforskningsinstituttet
Fish processing,
refine
ment
mechanical industry, freezing technology,
information technology, programmable
logical systems, robotics, optics, acoustics
Fiskeriforskning,
Havforskningsinstituttet
Conservation,
cold storage
materials technology, refrigeration
technology,
gas technology, NMR spectroscopy,
thermodynamics, transport theory, biology,
electronics
Institutt for bioteknologi NTH,
Institutt for kuldeteknikk NTH,
Fiskeriforskning
Trading of fish information technology, telecommunication,
signal processing, electronics
Marintek, NORUT
Fiskeriforskning
Transport and
transport
equipment
material technology, mechanical industry,
welding technology, refrigeration technology,
gas technology, telecommunication, signal
processing, thermodynamics
Marintek
Tab.(1) demonstrates a close linkage between the principal technologies of the
Norwegian aquaculture sector and some of today’s most advanced areas of industrial
innovation38. The salient observation is that aquaculture, typically classified as a ‘low
technology’ sector according to the standard OECD definition, in fact is an industry
in which advanced technologies are created, transformed, adopted and used. As
Tab.(1) essentially illustrates, aquaculture is the subject of substantial spillovers from
other industries.
An example of such spillovers comes from the food sector industry. A technology
known as extrusion that originated from the plastic foil industry, revolutionised
aquaculture industry in the early 80s. Extrusion, basically a thermic process that
converts solids into manipulatable, soft plastic mass, was applied to fish feed. In this
application, the organic feed, having been converted into a plastic mass is run
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through a dicer and made into pellets, which are then dried. The change-over to dry
feed , also forced change in complementary technologies, notably mechanical
feeders. In the early 70’s wet-food, unrefined bi-products from commercial fisheries
were dominant in aquaculture. Transport costs were high as this type of feed had to
be pumped through expensive acid proof pipes from land to the farm-enclosures. Dry
feed dramatically lowered transport as well as maintenance costs. The feed was both
lighter and could be conveyed and dispersed by means of air and not water pumps,
amongst other things reducing wear and tear on the pumps and pipes. As a result, a
large cluster of complementary technologies has emerged which also involve
technologies from the plastic industry: today’s wet-feed machines are approximately
3 times more expensive than the dry-feed systems.
Both feed-systems rely however on the bi-products of commercial fishing,
particularly ‘junk fish.’ As pressure on the oceans’ fish stocks increase, with more
and more ‘junk fish’ supplementing exhausted high quality sorts, 39, aquaculture’s
feed base is becoming more uncertain. This prospect has led to the industry’s search
for new sources for feed. Here again, aquaculture sector seems to be able to take
advantage of technologies originally generated elsewhere. The oil industry is
developing an artificial single cell protein by feeding bacteria methane gas. Biomar,
a feed company owned by the oil giant Norsk Hydro, finds the technique promising
for the use in farm feeds.
Another important area of technological spillover connected to feed techniques is
monitoring technology. In this area, interesting technologies are being developed
which promise to help farms in the important job of ensuring effective feeding
regimes. To this end, the aquaculture industry is in the process of adopting and
adapting the sonar technology that has become a mainstay of more traditional
fisheries in gathering information about the exact location and volume of fish stocks .
Such techniques, based on high-tech information technologies, acoustics and
advanced mathematical algorithms, can be used to monitor the behaviour of the
salmon in their pens. Monitoring behaviour in this way over time can help establish
feeding patterns. Further, as farm managers learn to recognise behavioural patterns,
this technique might also be used to uncover early symptoms of spreading diseases.
It is important to note that the Norwegian firms involved in developing monitoring
devices tailored to the needs of the aquaculture sector were also those active in
developing sonar for traditional fisheries, attesting to an active spillover process.
Other areas in which Norwegian firms are advancing are sea-farm enclosure
technologies, sea vessels and general offshore equipment. A report about European
competitiveness40 indicates that Norway’s strong industrial cluster related to shipping
industry, offshore and sub-sea technologies have put it in the lead in Europe.
Norwegian aquaculture is building its way into this cluster, learning from it while
contributing to it. In fact the labour productivity in aquaculture and that in oil
industry are correlated by a factor r = 0,93 in the period from 1978 - 1991. Tab.(1)
demonstrates that several of the research institutions active in aquaculture also have
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substantial interest in the oil industry. Sintef pops up repeatedly in this table,
especially under the name Marintek which is a strong research resource in general
offshore technologies. Particularly active in cross-industrial links are supply-oriented
firms such as Trio Machines, Aga Gass, SM Remote Systems, Fina Exploration, BP
Norway, BP Nutrition, Hydrogas and Marinaqua (Hydro/Statoil) which are involved
both with aquaculture and the oil industry. Meanwhile the Norwegian oil giant,
Norsk Hydro, owns one of the biggest fish farms (Mowi AS) and food producers
(Biomar) in Norway.
Tab.(1) however suggests that innovative capabilities related to fish-processing are
poorly developed within the Norwegian knowledge infrastructure. On this front,
Norwegian enterprises lag behind German, Danish and Icelandic firms, against
whom they have some trouble establishing themselves. The tactics of the dominant
players, who e.g. use service contracts that bar other firms (i.e. Norwegians)from
conducting repairs on their equipment, prevent potential Norwegian firms from
valuable learning by doing experience.
Having trouble competing head to head with established firms who are far ahead on
the learning curve, some Norwegian firms are managing to establish themselves in
this industry through other channels. The dominant firms rely to a large degree on
their established expertise in ‘mechatronics’, a hybrid of mechanical engineering and
electronics applied to fish-processing. Some Norwegian firms have found that they
can get involved in advances on this front through joint-ventures or in becoming
suppliers in international clusters. One case of this phenomenon is  the case of
Norwegian Trio Machines’ co-operation with the German giant Baader. A further
instructive example involves fish weighing equipment sold in Norway. Here the
hardware component is provided by the Icelandic firm Marel, while the software is
supplied by Maritech Systems.
As shown above, Norway is, in such high tech sectors as acoustics, optics,
electronics and information technologies, building up considerable knowledge
resources and applying them to aquaculture and fisheries. The Marel-Maritech case
illustrates that this approach may be the way ahead for Norway in the fish processing
field as well.
Norwegian aquaculture is in the technological forefront within several fields. Crucial
in this development have been the already existing Norwegian clusters within
shipping, offshore, and traditional fishing technologies. A knowledge infrastructure
depending on these milieus has been successfully established very much due to the
new market conditions with large competitive firms being able to absorb distant
technologies by establishing links to very advanced scientific milieus. Within this
infrastructure an innovative and technically very advanced aquaculture industry has
grown up. An essential point about low-tech industries is hence revealed through our
analyses: i) these industries do not necessarily create or access new technologies via
internal R&D, and ii) they often use inputs that are highly advanced and R&D
intensive.
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3.3. Technical Change and Minimum Efficient Size
The rapid technological change mapped above have affected the ‘Minimum Efficient
Size’41 in the aquaculture industry. In this section, we explore this issue by looking to
scale elasticities in terms of the following model:
First, let’s choose a scale elasticity, ε( )y , in such a way that constant returns to scale
give ε( )y =1; increasing returns to scale give ε( )y  > 1 and decreasing returns to scale
give ε( )y  < 1. Eq.(3) 42 satisfies these restrictions:
ε
∂
∂( ) /y
f
y
= 1 ln
ln
 (3)
where f is the minimal costs required to produce a quantity, y.
On the basis of Eq.(3) and data from the Department of Fisheries on costs and profits
from different Norwegian farms, Salvanes43 has estimated the scale elasticity,ε( )y ,
within Norwegian aquaculture companies in the period from 1982-90. The results are
shown in Tab.(2).
Table 2: Scale elasticity,ε( )y , for the average firm in Norwegian aquaculture 1982-
90. The null hypothesis is constant returns to scale, i.e. ε( )y  = 1.
Year 1982 1983 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
ε( )y 1.0360 1.0455 1.3327 1.3665 1.1764 1.1418 1.1696
Stand. error 0.03421 0.0215 0.0270 0.0351 0.0135 0.0100 0.0143
t-value 1.06 3.18 11.95 10.44 13.07 14.18 11.86
Tab.(2) demonstrates that there were increasing returns to scale from 1983-1990.
During the same period the size of firms increased. From 1986 to 1990 there was a
radical increase in the average production per farm. Measured in tons, the average
production per farm more than doubled from 1986 to 1990. In 1982 approximately
40% of the farms produced between 0-50 tons of fish for consumption, while in 1990
only 0,7% of the farms produced between 0-50 tons44. Hence it can be concluded
from the data that, while farms are increasing in size, it is possible to continue to
increase sizes further and thus pursue lower unit costs for the average sized firm.
The same authors found that even for the largest farms in Norway, scale potentials
were not fully realised in terms of scale elasticity for different levels of production
within a year (i.e. the local characteristics of the scale elasticity) Companies
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producing 600 tons per year still had a scale elasticity of 1,11 in 1990 while similar
study in 198945 showed that the scale elasticity was approximately 1 for the largest
firms in 1982-83. That meant that, at that time, economies of scale were fully
exploited and further expansion would not increase profits. Despite the fact that
today’s largest farms are larger than those in 1982-83, they demonstrate a scale
elasticity higher than 1. This indicates that- the minimum efficient size, MES, is on
the increase.
The increasing MES may be understood by looking at the technological development
within the industry. Interviews showed that the technological methods and level in
aquaculture before 1985 advanced according to ‘trial-and-error’. The farmers
generally drafted the pens themselves, while engineering firms were contracted to
construct them . These enclosures were often unable to withstand the elements and
the weak equipment of a good deal of farms were torn apart in storms. These would
be repaired and improved and launched time and again.
Figure 3: A cascade effect of technical change in a process oriented industry. The
impact of technological change on MES and innovative performance is shown.
Increased rate of 
learning
Market Concentration
Technical Change
Increased MES
In general, a pattern of the ‘home made’ characterised the early fish farms. It was not
until the mid 80’s, that aquaculture’s increasingly apparent potential lured in a
number of equipment suppliers and research institutions. With them, science entered
the industry in the form of sophisticated lab facilities. This spurred a period of
technological advance (e.g. submarines, sophisticated monitoring equipment,
advanced feeding systems, large boats: see above) and concomitantly, increasing
returns to scale. In turn, this development has apparently served to increase the MES,
a general tendency that is recognisable from several other process industries46.
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We have found that technical change has impacted on the MES of fish farms. The
growth of fish farms has further spurred innovative capabilities and learning within
the industry. Market concentration, technological change and MES is hence
interrelated properties as illustrated in Fig.(3). All these variables are highly policy
relevant. The government may hence create a competitive environment spurring
learning and innovative capabilities and thereby enhancing the absorptive ability of
firms to draw on the capabilities within a well funded technological infrastructure47.
Furthermore, by looking to Fig.(3), one sees that by regulating plant sizes, not
allowing plants to expand to MES, the process of learning and technical change may
slow down. On the other hand, it is quite clear that increasing farm sizes beyond
certain limits may have serious environmental impacts. We turn to this issue in the
next section.
3.4. Scale, Ownership and Environmental Impacts
The above arguments show some of the benefits to be achieved by increasing plant
size. Nevertheless, companies cannot lower unit costs by increasing output
indefinitely. At a certain point diminishing returns to scale will arise. Some of the
factors limiting the profits of increasing outputs beyond a certain level involve the
following48: Learning curves flatten out at very large cumulative outputs, creative
adoption by workers may be lost at a certain level of division of labour,
communication paths becomes inefficient beyond a certain plant size, motivation of
workers declines at a certain plant size, machines require special structural
reinforcement beyond a certain size, advantages of mass reversals flatten out at a
certain output level, transportation costs per unit increase at a certain output level.
Lastly, in the case of accidents, environmental damages increase sharply with plant
size. In the following we will especially focus on this latter aspect.
Are there plausible operational structures taking into account environmental issues
and that also are capable of exploiting economies of scale? Or in other words, how
may policy makers optimise the competitiveness of the farms also taking into
account environmental restrictions? We will in the following explore the
environmental impact of ownership regulations imposed by policy makers.
Fish farmers which want to exploit economies of scale, basically face two different
choices.
i) The farms are expanded to MES, all farms have separate owners.
ii) One farmer buy several other farms, or a number of companies starts operating
together as a merger; (the size of the farms staying unchanged)
                                                                                                                                         
Reinert, E., 1992, Industripolitikk og ulandsproblematikk - to sider av samme sak? Fremtek notat
22/92, Oslo, Norway.
47
 For an excellent review on the concept of technological infrastructure policy see M. Justman and
M. Teubal, 1995, Technological infrastructure policy: creating capabilities and building markets,
Research Policy 24, pp 259-281.
48
 Scherer, F.M. and Ross, D, 1990, Industrial Market Structures and Economic Performance, third
edition, Houghton Mifflin Company, New York, USA
22 STEP rapport / report R-02/1995
Let us look at these two possibilities in more detail: Due to the strong ownership
regulations, option i) was actually the only plausible one until 199149. From an
environmental point of view this kind of ownership regulations, where several
farmers each run separate plants, is highly negative. There are two reasons for this:
First the MES of each farm in option i is larger than the MES of each farm in option
ii (due to more complicated communication and transportation paths). Larger farms
contaminate fjords more than smaller ones, this is the case both in the routine
operation of the farm and in case of accidents. Still, although each pond is smaller
within option ii (than within option i), several of the benefits related to large scale are
maintained. Learning-by-doing and learning by using may in fact be even larger in a
multi-plant company than one operating a single farm, although the single-plant
operating company might control a huge farm. Firstly, the multi-plant operating firm
may draw experience from a number of different locations. Secondly, a company that
runs several farms is likely to produce a higher volume of fish than a single farm and
therefore is able to run faster down the learning curve than its single farm
competitors. Furthermore, the high output from the multi-farm company implies high
capital assets, which, as argued in Sec.(5.1). entails scale benefits when borrowing
capital. Overhead and competence may show similar patterns in the case of large
single-farms if they too are also spread over similarly large production outputs.
Mergers are perhaps especially interesting in the case of small firms joining large
ones. As argued in Sec.(5.1), capital raising enjoys especially pervasive large
economies of scale. When a small firm joins a large one, the smaller firm is likely to
benefit from the larger enterprise’s lower cost of capital. Indeed for small firms
without ready access to outside capital markets, difficult borrowing conditions may
be ameliorated. Case studies reveal that this may be one of the most compelling
advantages of mergers50. In addition, the small firm gets access to the knowledge,
competence and market base of the bigger firm and vice versa.
The second environmental related argument might be illustrated by the following
case: Imagine a fjord consisting of 10 farms, both the population of salmon in each
farm and the size of each farm is equal. Assume that the contamination from all the
farms is spread equally around the fjord. For simplicity we define environmental
damages as measured by the number of dead salmon only. Suppose one farm,
Company A, contaminates at a certain level, let’s say an amount equivalent to the
death of N salmons within a time period of n years. Within n years all farms will lose
N/10 salmons due to the contamination done by company A. Hence company A only
bears 10% of the direct costs due to the its own environmental damages. Suppose
now that company A buys all 10 farms in the fjord, while the biomass remains
unchanged. Now contaminating the fjord, company A has to bear 100% of the costs
due to the damages it has caused to nature. Thus a company’s incentive to
contaminate is lower, the larger volume of the sea the company has cultivated. Hence
reducing the number of firms operating within one region (the biomass being
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constant) is likely also to reduce contamination. Thus option ii, which only have been
plausible from 1991, is much more in line with environmental issues. Hence, (from
the above arguments), increasing market concentration ratios, increases incentives
not to contaminate.
The actual development within Norwegian aquaculture in fact underlines this latter
point. During the period when ownership was restricted on a one-owner, one farm
basis, a series of severe diseases struck Norwegian aquaculture51. In 1976 the first
serious disease hit an enterprise in Hammerfest and gradually spread down the coast.
This was followed by another epidemic, ‘Yersiniose’, that left large numbers of dead
fish in its wake, all along the Norwegian coast, from Finmark to Hordaland. A
bacterial kidney disease, ‘BKD’, hit plants in Hordaland and Sogn og Fjordane.
Infectious salmon anemia, ‘ILA’, broke out and spread along the coast the following
years. ‘Furunucleosis’, ‘Vibrose’ and followed by a number of other diseases that
spread along large parts of the Norwegian coast. The aquaculture industry reacted to
these diseases by heavily medicating their salmon by putting antibiotics into the fish
food. In 1987 the total amount of antibiotics utilised in aquaculture well exceeded the
level utilised in human medicine. While 49 tons active substance of antibiotics were
utilised in aquaculture, only 25 tons were utilised in human medicine and 12 tons in
veterinary medicine in Norway.
Hand in hand with the deregulation and liberation on ownership and the following
market concentration, environmental issues became highly apparent. Effective
vaccines were developed within an interdisciplinary milieu involving both scientific
knowledge centres and the aquaculture industry. In train with these common efforts
the volume of antibiotics declined dramatically. From 1987 to 1992 the amount of
antibiotics being utilised sunk from 49 tons to 25 tons, and in 1993 to 6 tons52. In
1994 the volume approached zero. Associated with this development, some of the
largest aquaculture companies have recently done substantial research on ‘Green
salmon’ or ‘Environmental salmon’. Central to this work is the aim to reduce the
plants’ extensive use of chemicals. The outcome of this process was the introduction
of a fish called ‘gold sinny wrasse’, which feeds on the salmon’s sea lice. Many of
the largest farms in Norway are now substituting previous reliance on extensive
chemical delicing solutions by introducing gold sinny wrasse into the pens. In
addition to removing sea lice from the salmon, the gold sinny wrasse also eat
organisms growing and accumulating on the ponds, for instance mussels. Therefore
the farmers may also reduce the number of surface treatments as lamination of the
ponds etc. Most such lamination entails copper which is poisonous to the
environment. Norwegian aquaculture utilises approximately 800.000 litres of
lamination per year which contain about 130 tons copper. Approximately one gram
of copper is today utilised per farmed fish. Hence the potential environmental gains
in utilising gold sinny wrasse are substantial. The incentive to introduce knowledge-
                                                
51
 Adding to the problem was also the production regulation during the period. The upper limit on
production where put on pond volumes, not on production quantities. Consequently several farmers
wanting to exploit economies of scale, increased the density of fish in the ponds. In turn, increasing
the density of fish, stressed the fish and made it less resistant to deseases.
52
 NENT, 1993, Oppdrettslaks - en studie i norsk teknologiutvikling, TMV forlag, Oslo, Norway.
Norske fiskeoppdretters forening, årsberetning og regnskap 1993
24 STEP rapport / report R-02/1995
intensive, environmentally friendly products hence seems to be dependant on
ownership structures.
It is pointed out that there are increasing returns to scale in aquaculture. In order to
exploit this element of the economy under environmental restrictions, the most
plausible future competitive structure within aquaculture seems to be mergers or
companies operating several plants within the same region. This structure enjoys
several of the same benefits as larger, single-plant companies do, and in addition the
solution is ‘greener’. Governments should encourage structures of multi-plant
operations or mergers to come about as rapidly as possible.
25
4. Conclusions
Low-tech industries constitute an essential part of the economy in several countries.
Europe has a higher proportion of its output in so-called ‘mature’ industries than
either the USA or Japan, and Norway has a much higher proportion than Europe as a
whole. Providing knowledge on how these industries may sustain economic growth
and welfare in the future, therefore represent a key policy issue. This study provides
a detailed discussion on the impacts of political regulations on one such low-tech
industry in Norway, the aquaculture industry.
It is shown that the transition of policies from the promotion of a labour intensive,
atomistic business structure to the adaptation of a high tech policy, significantly has
affected the competitiveness of the aquaculture industry. The changing political
regulations have resulted in an increase in i) learning rates, ii) innovation and the
abilities to transform and access distant technologies by establishing strong links to
research intensive sectors. Furthermore it is shown that this development, in turn, has
resulted in an augmentation of the ‘minimum efficient scale’ of fish farms. We
review these issues in some detail below.
Low capital accumulation and new international potentials seen within the
aquaculture sector, resulted in a shift in policies starting from about 1985.
Essentially, three aspects were emphasised: i) dramatic Increases in governmental
expenditure on R&D, ii) a continuos increase in maximum permitted pond volumes
and iii) ownership liberalisation.
Ownership liberalisation resulted in increasing market concentration ratios and the
attraction of capital to the sector. Looking indicators on innovative performance, it is
seen that this development in turn resulted in an increase in innovative incentives and
capabilities:
Labour productivity was more or less constant until 1987. From this year on it
augmented rapidly. From 1987 to 1991 the output per man-hour increased by a factor
3.3. Furthermore, plotting output quantities and labour productivity and comparing it
to the standard 80% learning curve, gives further insights. This comparison reflects a
relative slow learning rate in aquaculture from 1978 until 1987. During this period
the gap between the standard 80% curve and the aquaculture curve opens. From 1987
the gap starts closing, and the curves emerge in 1990-1991. From 1992 the learning
rates in aquaculture well exceeds that of the 80% curve.
Looking to market concentration ratios this latter, dramatic increase in learning rates
from 1992, may be explained. The CR4 index, the percentage of total output
produced by the four largest firms, augmented from 5% in the late 80’s to 25% in
1994. Thus increases in learning rates may be explained by linking output quantities
to learning-by-doing and learning-by-using. Holding total production constant,
market concentration implies that companies increase their absolute output per year,
thus their accumulated experience per year increases and they push faster down the
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learning curve. Within an industry where learning-by-doing and tacit knowledge53 is
crucial, knowledge is linked to experience. Therefore gaining experience faster than
competitors is a key point to sustain competitiveness in this industry.
This observation do not necessarily mean that all low-tech industrial plants must be
large in order not to be shut down. Very small farms do have advantages because the
worker(s) usually know the plant by heart, having invested considerable time in the
project and followed every detailed change in plant conditions. In aquaculture such
an insight may for instance cause the worker(s) to detect abnormal behaviour of fish
and diseases at a very early stage and thereby save costs. Furthermore very small
plants do not necessarily utilise technologies that exhibit increasing returns to scale,
thus having low capital intensity. A low capital intensity allows the small farms to
regulate production quantities according to existing conditions. Most strikingly this is
seen within fisheries where large boats with advanced capital intensive technologies
are bound to fish large amounts in order to pay back their investments. This has
resulted in a resource crises, where several species of fish are about to be depleted.
Smaller boats, on the other hand, with low capital investments, are able to stay in
business even in times when only small amounts can be taken out of the oceans. The
above argument rather suggests that large farms are very important in order to be
able to develop the cluster surrounding the low-tech industry. In low-tech industries
it is generally the large farms which have the competence, experience and capital
making them able to co-operate tightly with research and supply institutions in a
interactive innovative framework. In turn, this cluster is crucially important for the
development of the low-tech industry itself, both for large and small plants.
It is shown that technical change and the absorptive capacity in aquaculture made a
positive jump in the period of rapid market concentration. From technical change
based on ‘trial-and-error’ in the 70’s and the early 80’s, links to advanced scientific
miles and supplier industries were made from the mid 80’s. These links made the
aquaculture industry able to access and absorb technologies very far away from their
core capabilities and close to the most advanced areas of technological innovation.
Within this feedback system, innovations arise and technologies are transformed to
meet the specialised requirements of different low-tech industries. This reveals two
essential points about low-tech industries: i) these industries do not necessarily create
or access new technologies via internal R&D, and ii) they often use inputs that are
highly advanced and R&D intensive. By implication, it is very much the
boundedness in the search process, the ability to connect to larger networks of
knowledge infrastructure and hence the absorptive capacity of the low-tech firms,
that shape their technological opportunities. As shown above these abilities are also
shaped policy regulations.
The feature described above is a crucial insight for policy makers. As the
technological opportunities (within low-tech industries) are strongly shaped by the
links to industry and science bases, technical change in these industries is also
crucially dependant upon the existence of national clusters that are strongly
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committed to the low-tech industry in question. In the case of aquaculture, it is
shown that such a cluster has emerged within marine electronics, pond technologies,
boat and offshore equipment, feeding systems and technologies depending on
information technologies in general. Within these systems, Norwegian aquaculture
farmers are both users and creatively transformers of new technologies, co-operating
closely with supply and research knowledge bases. On the other hand within
processing technologies, or refinement, Norway holds a very weak position. This is
quite strikingly the case both for the supply industry and the farmers themselves.
Further underlining the argument, Denmark and Island holds a strong position within
both the creation of processing equipment and within the consumption and utilisation
of processing equipment. Actually, partly due to excellent processing skills,
Denmark creates as many jobs on the basis of Norwegian fish as Norway54. By
implication, to alter the situation it is important to establish strong Norwegian
clusters and supply industries, widely serving the processing sector, in order to
enhance rapid interactive learning within an innovative frame55.
Finally it is shown that the rapid technical change experienced within the aquaculture
sector, has augmented the ‘minimum efficient size of fish farms’. This has some
implications for the environment, as larger farms contaminate the sea more than
smaller ones. This development is on some way balanced by ownership liberalisation
and by market concentration. A simple theoretical argument shows that incentives to
contaminate decreases with market concentration. Some empirical evidence
underline this statement. The amount of medicine and antibiotics utilised, which
reflects in the health of fish and hence water conditions, has dramatically decreased
hand in hand with market concentration.
The future of Norwegian low-tech industries and its ability to innovate and absorb
new technologies, will very much depend on its ability to expand its search process.
The horizon in this process is heavily shaped and restricted by the competitive
environment imposed on the low tech industries by the government and by the
commitment of public and private research and supply institutions. Today some of
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the most important of these institutions and firms, which serve the aquaculture
sector, originate from offshore, oil and fisheries. Accordingly, some of the most
important innovations in the aquaculture sector have links to these three sectors.
More remote technologies depending on optics, acoustics and information
technologies in general are also consumed and transformed within the aquaculture
sector, but nearly without exception, these technologies are accessed through the
described institutions. This emphasises the importance of establishing a fine grained
technological and scientific knowledge infrastructure in order to enable low-tech
industries to access new, advanced technologies, and to survive in increasingly
competitive environments.
29
References
Abramovitz M., 1956, Resource and output trends in the US since 1870, American
Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, pp. 5-23.
Asheim B., 1994, Teknologi politikk som regional politikk, Step Report 18/94, Oslo,
Norway.
Bell, M., and Pavitt K., 1993, Technological Accumulation and Industrial Growth, Industrial
and Corporate Change, Vol. 2, No 2, pp 157-203, Bell and Bain Ltd., Great Britain.
Bertheussen S., 1986, Elektronisk veie-og datasystem for håving av fisk, 1986,
Fiskeriforskning. Rapport.
Bertheussen S., 1984, Produksjonsstyring med EDB: eksempler fra filetproduksjon, 1984,
Fiskeriforskning. Rapport.
Blakstad F. and Dahle L.A., 1994, Utvikling av norsk utsyrsindustri til havbruksnæringen.
Perspektivanalyse 1992 - 2010, Marintek AS og Akvainstituttet AS, Tronheim, Norway.
Blakstad F. and Dahle L. A., 1994, Utvikling av norsk utsyrsindustri til havbruksnæringen.
Perspektivanalyse 1992 - 2010. Stautsanalyse Norge, Marintek AS og Akvainstituttet AS,
Tronheim, Norway.
Boston Consulting Group, 1968, Perspectives on Experience, Boston, USA.
Bush V., 1960, Science the Endless Frontier, National Science Foundation, USA..
Christensen L.R., Jørgenson D.W., and Lau L.J., 1973, Transendental Logaritmic Production
Frontiers, Reveiw of Economics and Staticstics 55, pp 28-45
Cobb C. W. and Douglas P. H., 1928, A Theory of Production, AER p.p.139-65.
Dalum B., 1989, Export specialisation, competitiveness and national systems of innovation,
Ålborg, Institutt for produktion, Danmark
Dietrichs, E. and Smith K., 1994, Hva er fiskeriteknologi - en oversikt over fiskerienes
teknologiske grunnlag og dens regionale dimensjon, Step rapport 22/94, Oslo, Norway.
Djuve, A.B. and Steen A. H., 1994, Norsk fisk - dansk produkt?, FAFO rapport nr 143, Oslo,
Norway.
Dosi G., 1982, Technological Paradigms and Trajectories, Research policy, nr 11, 147-162,
North Holland Publishing Company.
Edquist C., 1993, Innovations politikk for fornyelse av svensk industri, Tema T rapport 33,
Universitetet i Lindkjøping, Sweden.
Edquist C. and Kelvey M. Mc., 1992, The diffusion of new product technologies and
productivity growth in Swedish industry, Consortium on competitiveness and cooperation
working paper, No 91-15, Center for research in management, University of Calfornia,
Berkley.
30 STEP rapport / report R-02/1995
Fiskeridepartementet, 1972-73, Om midlertidig lov om bygging, innredning, etablering og
utvidelse av anlegg for klekking av rogn og oppdrett av fisk, Ot.pr. 46, §2, p.3, Oslo,
Norway.
Fiskeridepartementet, 1972-73, Om midlertidig lov om bygging, innredning, etablering og
utvidelse av anlegg for klekking av rogn og oppdrett av fisk, Ot.pr. 46, §2, p.3, Oslo,
Norway.( my translation.)
Fiskeridepartementet, 1986, Om havbruk, Stortingsmelding nr. 65, Oslo, Norway.
Fiskeridepartementet, 1990-91, Om lov om endring i lov 14. juni 1985 nr 68 om oppdrett av
fisk, skalldyr m.v., ot.prop.55, Oslo, Norway.
Fiskerinæringens Landsforening, 1993, Norsk Fiskeindustri mot år 2000, Troms trykk AS,
Tromsø, Norway.
Gorden M. W., 1987, Effective protection, Palgrave Dictionary, The Macmillan Press Ltd.,
London, England.
Hansen K., 1992, Innovasjoner i fiskeindustrien - hva kjennetegner brukerne,
Fiskeriforskning, Rapport nr. 14/92.
Hansen K., 1991, Innovasjoner i fiskeindustrien - hva som kjennetegner bedrift og teknologi,
Fiskeriforskning Rapport nr. 10/91
Heertje A., 1973, Economics and Technical Change, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London,
Great Britain.
Hirschman, W. B., 1964, Profit from the Learnig Curve, Harvard Business Reveiw, USA.
Hulst .V. and Olds, B., 1993, On High Tech Snobbery, Research Policy 22, 455-62.
Kommunaldepartementet, 1990-91, På rett kjøl, om kystens utviklingsmuligheter,
Stortingsmelding nr. 32,Oslo, Norway.
Mc Combie J.S.L., Verdoorn’s Law, Palgrave Dictionary, edited by Eatwell J.,
Milgrate M. and Newman P., The Macmillan Press Ltd., London, Great Britain.
Nelson R.R. and Winter S. G., 1982, An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change,
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA
Nelson R.R. (editor), 1993, National Innovation Systems, Oxford University Press,
Oxford, New York, USA.
Nelson R. R., 1991, The role of firm differences in an evolutionary theory of technical
advance, Science and Public Policy, Volume 18, No 6, pp. 347-52
NENT, 1993, Oppdrettslaks - en studie i norsk teknologiutvikling, TMV forlag, Oslo,
Norway.
Adopting a ‘High-Tech’ Policy in a ‘Low-Tech’ Industry. The Case of Aquaculture 31
Norges fiskeriforskningsråd, 1992, Strategiplan for fiskeri- og havbruksforskningen fram
mot år 2000, Trondheim, Norway.
Norges fiskeriforskningsråd, 1989, Perspektivanalyser fro langtidsplan for fiskerforskningen
1990-1994, Trondheim, Norway.
Norges fiskeriforskningsråd, 1986-93, Prosjkektoversikt kataloger, Tronheim, Norway.
Norges offentlige utredninger, 1977, Om fiskeoppdrett, NOU:39, Universitetsforlaget, Oslo,
Norway.
Norges offentlige utredninger, 1992, Krisa i Lakseoppdrettsnæringa, nr. 36, Statens
trykningstjeneste, Oslo, Norway.
OECD, 1991, Technology in a Changing World, OECD Publication Service, Paris CEDEX
16, France.
Otterstad O. and Jentoft S, 1994, Leve Kysten?, Ad Notam, Oslo, Norway.
Porter M. E., 1990, The Competitive Advantage of Nations, The Mac Millan Press Limited,
London, Great Britain.
Rae J., 1834, Statements of some new principles on the subject of political economy,
exposing the fallacies of the system of free trade, and some other doctrines maintained in the
‘Wealth of Nations’, Boston, USA..
Reinert E., 1992, Industrial politikk og u-landspolitikk - to sider av samme sak?
Fremtek notat 22/92, Oslo, Norway.
Reinert E., 1993, Catching up from way behind - a third world perspective on first world
history, Fremtek notat 8/93.
Reinert E., 1980, International Trade and the Economic Mechanism of Underdevelopment,
Ann Arbor, University Microfilms International, Michigan, USA.
Reve T. and Mathisen L., 1994, European Competetivness, Norges Handelshøyskole,
Bergen, Norway.
Rosenberg N., 1982, Inside the Black Box: Technology and Economics, 1982, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, Great Britain.
Rosenberg N., 1994, Exploring the Black Box, pp 233, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, Great Britain.
Salvanes K.G. and Tveterås R., 1992, Stabilisering av varemarknader: Ein analyse av
innfrysningsordninga for laks, vedlegg 3 i Krisa i Lakseoppdretttsnæringa, NOU 1992: 36,
Seksjon statens trykking, Oslo, Norway.
Salvanes K. G. and Tveterås R., 1992, Kostnadsutvikling for norsk oppdrett 1982-90:
Intertemporale og regionale produktivitets skilnader, p. 165, Vedlegg 3 til Krisa i
lakseoppdrettsnæringa.
32 STEP rapport / report R-02/1995
Salvanes K. G., 1989, The structure of the Norwegian aquaculture industry: An empirical
analyses of Economies of scale and substitution possibilities, Marine resource economics
nr.6, pp. 349-373.
Scherer F.M. and Ravenschaft D. J., 1985, Mergers, Sell-offs and Economic Efficiency, pp
134-141, 192-193, Washington Brookings, USA.
Scherer, F.M. and Ross, D, 1990, Industrial Market Structures and Economic Performance,
third edition, Houghton Mifflin Company, New York, USA.
Scherer F. M., Inter-Industry Technological Flows in the US, 1982, Research Policy 11, pp.
227-45.
Schumpeter, J. A., 1912, Theorie der Wirtschaflichen Entvicklung, Leipzig, Germany;
Schumpeter, J. A., 1939, Business Cycles, New York, USA;
Schumpeter, J. A., 1942, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, New York, USA
Smith K., 1991, Innovation Policy in an Evolutionary Context, in Evolutionary Theories of
Economic and Technological Change, edited by P.P. Saviotti and J. S.
Metcalfe, Harwood Academic Publisher, Chur, Switzerland.
Smith K., 1994, New directions in research and technology policies: Identifying the key
issues, STEP rapport 1/94, Oslo, Norway.
Smith K., Nås S.O., Riiser V., Sandven T., 1993, Fremtek notat 10/93.
Solow R., 1957, Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function, Review of
Economics and Statistics, Vol 39 No 3, pp. 312-320.
Storøy J. and Engebretsen K., 1993, ITIT - et informasjonssytem for overvåking av
fisketransporter, Marintek AS
The Economist, March 1994,The tragedy of the oceans.
Tyson L., 1992, Who’s bashing whom? Trade conflicts in High-Technology industries,
Washington DC, Institute for international economics.
Various authors, 1976, United Fruit Company: Un Caso del Imperialista en Cuba, Editorial
de Cienclias Social, La Habana, Cuba.
Wicken O., 1994, Norsk fiskeriteknologi i historisk perspektiv, Step rapport 17/94, Oslo,
Norway.
67(3
6WXGLHVLQWHFKQRORJ\LQQRYDWLRQDQGHFRQRPLFSROLF\
STEP rapporter / reports
ISSN 0804-8185
1994
1/94
Keith Smith
New directions in research and technology policy: Identifying the key issues
2/94
Svein Olav Nås og Vemund Riiser
FoU i norsk næringsliv 1985-1991
3/94
Erik S. Reinert
Competitiveness and its predecessors – a 500-year cross-national perspective
4/94
Svein Olav Nås, Tore Sandven og Keith Smith
Innovasjon og ny teknologi i norsk industri: En oversikt
5/94
Anders Ekeland
Forskermobilitet i næringslivet i 1992
6/94
Heidi Wiig og Anders Ekeland
Naturviternes kontakt med andre sektorer i samfunnet
7/94
Svein Olav Nås
Forsknings- og teknologisamarbeid i norsk industri
8/94
Heidi Wiig og Anders Ekeland
Forskermobilitet i instituttsektoren i 1992
9/94
Johan Hauknes
Modelling the mobility of researchers
10/94
Keith Smith
Interactions in knowledge systems: Foundations, policy implications and empirical methods
11/94
Erik S. Reinert
Tjenestesektoren i det økonomiske helhetsbildet
12/94
Erik S. Reinert and Vemund Riiser
Recent trends in economic theory – implications for development geography
13/94
Johan Hauknes
Tjenesteytende næringer – økonomi og teknologi
14/94
Johan Hauknes
Teknologipolitikk i det norske statsbudsjettet
II
67(3
6WXGLHVLQWHFKQRORJ\LQQRYDWLRQDQGHFRQRPLFSROLF\
15/94
Erik S. Reinert
A Schumpeterian theory of underdevelopment – a contradiction in terms?
16/94
Tore Sandven
Understanding R&D performance: A note on a new OECD indicator
17/94
Olav Wicken
Norsk fiskeriteknologi – politiske mål i møte med regionale kulturer
18/94
Bjørn Asheim
Regionale innovasjonssystem: Teknologipolitikk som regionalpolitikk
19/94
Erik S. Reinert
Hvorfor er økonomisk vekst geografisk ujevnt fordelt?
20/94
William Lazonick
Creating and extracting value: Corporate investment behaviour and economic performance
21/94
Olav Wicken
Entreprenørskap i Møre og Romsdal. Et historisk perspektiv
22/94
Espen Dietrichs og Keith Smith
Fiskerinæringens teknologi og dens regionale forankring
23/94
William Lazonick and Mary O’Sullivan
Skill formation in wealthy nations: Organizational evolution and economic consequences
1995
1/95
Heidi Wiig and Michelle Wood
What comprises a regional innovation system? An empirical study
2/95
Espen Dietrichs
Adopting a ‘high-tech’ policy in a ‘low-tech’ industry. The case of aquaculture
3/95
Bjørn Asheim
Industrial Districts as ‘learning regions’. A condition for prosperity
4/95
Arne Isaksen
Mot en regional innovasjonspolitikk for Norge
67(3
6WXGLHVLQWHFKQRORJ\LQQRYDWLRQDQGHFRQRPLFSROLF\
III
1996
1/96
Arne Isaksen m. fl.
Nyskapning og teknologiutvikling i Nord-Norge. Evaluering av NT programmet
2/96
Svein Olav Nås
How innovative is Norwegian industry? An international comparison
3/96
Arne Isaksen
Location and innovation. Geographical variations in innovative activity in Norwegian
manufacturing industry
4/96
Tore Sandven
Typologies of innovation in small and medium sized enterprises in Norway
5/96
Tore Sandven
Innovation outputs in the Norwegian economy: How innovative are small firms and medium
sized enterprises in Norway
6/96
Johan Hauknes and Ian Miles
Services in European Innovation Systems: A review of issues
7/96
Johan Hauknes
Innovation in the Service Economy
8/96
Terje Nord og Trond Einar Pedersen
Endring i telekommunikasjon - utfordringer for Norge
9/96
Heidi Wiig
An empirical study of the innovation system in Finmark
10/96
Tore Sandven
Technology acquisition by SME’s in Norway
11/96
Mette Christiansen, Kim Møller Jørgensen and Keith Smith
Innovation Policies for SMEs in Norway
12/96
Eva Næss Karlsen, Keith Smith and Nils Henrik Solum
Design and Innovation in Norwegian Industry
13/96
Bjørn T. Asheim and Arne Isaksen
Location, agglomeration and innovation: Towards regional innovation systems in Norway?
14/96
William Lazonick and Mary O’Sullivan
Sustained Economic Development
IV
67(3
6WXGLHVLQWHFKQRORJ\LQQRYDWLRQDQGHFRQRPLFSROLF\
15/96
Eric Iversen og Trond Einar Pedersen
Postens stilling i det globale informasjonsamfunnet: et eksplorativt studium
16/96
Arne Isaksen
Regional Clusters and Competitiveness: the Norwegian Case
1997
1/97
Svein Olav Nås and Ari Leppãlahti
Innovation, firm profitability and growth
2/97
Arne Isaksen and Keith Smith
Innovation policies for SMEs in Norway: Analytical framework and policy options
3/97
Arne Isaksen
Regional innovasjon: En ny strategi i tiltaksarbeid og regionalpolitikk
4/97
Errko Autio, Espen Dietrichs, Karl Führer and Keith Smith
Innovation Activities in Pulp, Paper and Paper Products in Europe
5/97
Rinaldo Evangelista, Tore Sandven, Georgio Sirilli and Keith Smith
Innovation Expenditures in European Industry
1998
R-01/1998
Arne Isaksen
Regionalisation and regional clusters as development strategies in a global economy
R-02/1998
Heidi Wiig and Arne Isaksen
Innovation in ultra-peripheral regions: The case of Finnmark and rural areas in Norway
R-03/1998
William Lazonick and Mary O’Sullivan
Corporate Governance and the Innovative Economy: Policy implications
R-04/1998
Rajneesh Narula
Strategic technology alliances by European firms since 1980: questioning integration?
R-05/1998
Rajneesh Narula
Innovation through strategic alliances: moving towards international partnerships and
contractual agreements
67(3
6WXGLHVLQWHFKQRORJ\LQQRYDWLRQDQGHFRQRPLFSROLF\
V
R-06/1998
Svein Olav Nås et al.
Formal competencies in the innovation systems of the Nordic countries: An analysis based on
register data
R-07/1998
Svend-Otto Remøe og Thor Egil Braadland
Internasjonalt erfarings-grunnlag for teknologi- og innovasjonspolitikk: relevante
implikasjoner for Norge
R-08/1998
Svein Olav Nås
Innovasjon i Norge: En statusrapport
R-09/1998
Finn Ørstavik
Innovation regimes and trajectories in goods transport
R-10/1998
H. Wiig Aslesen, T. Grytli, A. Isaksen, B. Jordfald, O. Langeland og O. R. Spilling
Struktur og dynamikk i kunnskapsbaserte næringer i Oslo
R-11/1998
Johan Hauknes
Grunnforskning og økonomisk vekst: Ikke-instrumentell kunnskap
R-12/1998
Johan Hauknes
Dynamic innovation systems: Do services have a role to play?
R-13/1998
Johan Hauknes
Services in Innovation – Innovation in Services
R-14/1998
Eric Iversen, Keith Smith and Finn Ørstavik
Information and communication technology in international policy discussions
6WRUJDWHQ12VOR1RUZD\
7HOHSKRQH
)D[
:HEhttp://www.step.no/
67(3JUXSSHQ EOH HWDEOHUW L  IRU n IRUV\QH
EHVOXWQLQJVWDNHUH PHG IRUVNQLQJ NQ\WWHW WLO DOOH
VLGHU YHG LQQRYDVMRQ RJ WHNQRORJLVN HQGULQJ PHG
V UOLJ YHNW Sn IRUKROGHW PHOORP LQQRYDVMRQ
¡NRQRPLVN YHNVW RJ GH VDPIXQQVPHVVLJH
RPJLYHOVHU %DVLV IRU JUXSSHQV DUEHLG HU
HUNMHQQHOVHQ DY DW XWYLNOLQJHQ LQQHQ YLWHQVNDS RJ
WHNQRORJLHU IXQGDPHQWDO IRU¡NRQRPLVNYHNVW’HW
JMHQVWnU OLNHYHO PDQJH XO¡VWH SUREOHPHU RPNULQJ
KYRUGDQ SURVHVVHQ PHG YLWHQVNDSHOLJ RJ
WHNQRORJLVN HQGULQJ IRUO¡SHU RJ KYRUGDQ GHQQH
SURVHVVHQ InU VDPIXQQVPHVVLJH RJ ¡NRQRPLVNH
NRQVHNYHQVHU)RUVWnHOVHDYGHQQHSURVHVVHQHUDY
VWRUEHW\GQLQJIRUXWIRUPLQJHQRJLYHUNVHWWHOVHQDY
IRUVNQLQJV WHNQRORJL RJ LQQRYDVMRQVSROLWLNNHQ
)RUVNQLQJHQ L 67(3JUXSSHQ HU GHUIRU VHQWUHUW
RPNULQJ KLVWRULVNH ¡NRQRPLVNH VRVLRORJLVNH RJ
RUJDQLVDWRULVNH VS¡UVPnO VRP HU UHOHYDQWH IRU GH
EUHGH IHOWHQH LQQRYDVMRQVSROLWLNN RJ ¡NRQRPLVN
YHNVW
7KH67(3JURXSZDVHVWDEOLVKHGLQWRVXSSRUW
SROLF\PDNHUV ZLWK UHVHDUFK RQ DOO DVSHFWV RI
LQQRYDWLRQDQGWHFKQRORJLFDOFKDQJHZLWKSDUWLFXODU
HPSKDVLV RQ WKH UHODWLRQVKLSV EHWZHHQ LQQRYDWLRQ
HFRQRPLFJURZWKDQGWKHVRFLDO FRQWH[W7KHEDVLV
RIWKHJURXS•VZRUNLVWKHUHFRJQLWLRQWKDWVFLHQFH
WHFKQRORJ\ DQG LQQRYDWLRQ DUH IXQGDPHQWDO WR
HFRQRPLFJURZWK\HWWKHUHUHPDLQPDQ\XQUHVROYHG
SUREOHPVDERXWKRZWKHSURFHVVHVRIVFLHQWLILFDQG
WHFKQRORJLFDOFKDQJHDFWXDOO\RFFXUDQGDERXWKRZ
WKH\ KDYH VRFLDO DQG HFRQRPLF LPSDFWV 5HVROYLQJ
VXFK SUREOHPV LV FHQWUDO WR WKH IRUPDWLRQ DQG
LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ RI VFLHQFH WHFKQRORJ\ DQG
LQQRYDWLRQ SROLF\ 7KH UHVHDUFK RI WKH 67(3 JURXS
FHQWUHV RQ KLVWRULFDO HFRQRPLF VRFLDO DQG
RUJDQLVDWLRQDO LVVXHV UHOHYDQW IRU EURDG ILHOGV RI
LQQRYDWLRQSROLF\DQGHFRQRPLFJURZWK
